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Abstract
BACKGROUND
Pressures to keep immigration rates at relatively high levels are likely to persist in most
developed countries. At the same time, immigrant cohorts are becoming more and more
diverse, leading host societies to become increasingly heterogeneous across multiple
dimensions. For scholars who study demographic or socio-economic behaviours, the
need to account for ethno-cultural “super-diversity” brings new challenges.
OBJECTIVE
The main objective of this paper is to present a framework for the prospective analysis
of super-diversity in several high immigration countries.
METHODS
We developed microsimulation models that simultaneously project several population
dimensions for Canada, the United States and countries of the European Union, with
the aim of studying the consequences of alternate future population and migration
trends.
RESULTS
The paper presents the projected progression of three indicators of diversity: percentage
of foreign-born population, percentage of the population using a non-official language
at home and percentage of non-Christians. It also examines the projected changes in the
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labour force by education levels and language. Using alternative scenarios, we also
show that the proportion of highly educated in the US and EU28 labour force could
increase by 11 and 15 percentage points respectively if future immigrants were selected
as in Canada. Finally, the paper proposes a new longitudinal indicator that counts the
number of years lived as active and inactive over the life course for foreign- and native-
born cohorts.
CONTRIBUTION
The microsimulation models provide much more informative results than more
traditional cohort-component models to study the future effects of ethno-cultural super-
diversity on high immigration countries.
1. Introduction
In what Coleman (2006) terms the “Third Demographic Transition,” immigration has
led to rapid increases in cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity in many high-income,
low-fertility countries. This rise in ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec 2007) has challenged
researchers and policy makers as they attempt to understand, anticipate the needs of,
and develop policies and programs for multiple, highly diverse, subgroups. For
demographers, the cohort-component projection model has long served as a crucial
policy and planning tool, yet this macro-level approach is too blunt of an instrument for
modeling. In this paper, we argue that a microsimulation approach is better suited for
this task, and we demonstrate this approach using a microsimulation model we
developed for Canada, the United States, and the 28 EU member states of the European
Union.
2. The rise in super-diversity
Super-diversity has emerged in the broader context of a new demographic regime
characterized by low fertility, high immigration, and population aging. Most developed
countries are facing similar demographic changes: population aging, possible labour
shortages (Mahroum 2001; Martin and Ruhs 2011; Ruhs and Anderson 2010), and
reduced population growth, if not population decline (United Nations Population
Division 2017). The Baby-Boom experienced by these countries after World War II
was followed by a rapid fertility decline, which initiated population aging (Caldwell
and Schindlmayr 2003; Coale and Watkins 1986; Gavrilov and Heuveline 2003).
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Boomers are now reaching retirement age and are being replaced by smaller cohorts of
young workers, which may compromise a balance between labour force demand and
supply in specific sectors of the labour market.
In response to these trends, most developed countries have increased their
immigration to historically high levels. In fact, more people are living abroad than ever
before. The United Nations estimates that there were 244 million migrants in 2013, up
from 173 million in 2000, and more than two-thirds (71%) of all international migrants
live in developed regions (United Nations Population Division 2016). Accordingly,
immigration rates have significantly increased in Canada, Australia, the United
Kingdom, Austria, Italy, and elsewhere in Europe (Australian Department of
Immigration and Citizenship 2012; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2012;
Coleman 2009; Jennissen, Van Der Gaag, and Van Wissen 2006; Zaiceva and
Zimmermann 2008).
International net migration now accounts for about two-thirds of the total
population growth of developed nations, outpacing natural increase (Population
Reference Bureau 2012). Most observers believe that the current below-replacement
fertility regime in Europe will hold true in the future (Frejka and Ross 2001;
Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999; McDonald 2002). Furthermore, in a little more than a
decade, the rate of natural increase will become negative in many developed countries,
leaving immigration as the only positive driver of population growth (Lutz, Butz, and
KC 2014). Moreover, in the context of population aging where a growing number of
people are about to withdraw from the labour market, economic pressures to keep
immigration rates at fairly high levels are likely to persist (Martel et al. 2007;
Zimmermann et al. 2007).
At the same time, immigration to developed countries has become more culturally
diverse (Cohen and Van Hear 2008; Coleman 2006; Massey et al. 1993), dramatically
changing the nature of population diversity to such an extent that Vertovec (2007) was
led to create the neologism super-diversity. The term refers to the fact that in many
Western countries population diversity has increased to an unprecedented level due to
both increased immigration levels and an increase in the number of source countries
(Frey 2014). While past immigration to Canada, the United States, France, and
Germany, as examples, was composed of a succession of cohorts of immigrants with
similar demographic, socioeconomic, and geographical attributes, what characterizes
the most recent immigration is the diversification of its sources and of the
characteristics of its members. Thus, the diversity of the host population increases not
only because of the increasing number or proportion of immigrants from diverse
backgrounds but also because of their own diversification in terms of ethno-cultural or
socioeconomic characteristics. Diversity thus has now multiple, overlapping
dimensions involving sociocultural factors such as race, ethnicity, language, and
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religion, and a host of social and economic factors that are associated with these
sociocultural factors. Recent censuses and surveys show increasing numbers and
proportions of immigrants, of people belonging to visible minority (ethnic/racial)
groups (Statistics Canada 2013), of speakers of nonofficial languages (Rampton, Harris,
and Leung 1997; Statistics Canada 2007), and of people whose religion is not Christian
(Goujon et al. 2007; Parsons 1994; Peach 2005; Statistics Canada 2003). These trends
are expected to continue in the future (Winter and Teitelbaum 2013), raising questions
about the long-term sustainability of Western countries’ social security programs,
healthcare, and retirement plans and inequalities (Anderson and Hussey 2000;
Auerbach and Lee 2011; Lichter 2013; OECD 2000). Although Vertovec attaches some
importance to the emergence of new high levels for these variables, he doesn’t define
super-diversity by a threshold, in terms of the percentage of the population of a country
that has one or the other of these characteristics, but by the fact that the multiplicity of
countries of origin that characterizes recent immigration results in multiple
configurations that require a multi-dimensional perspective on diversity to better inform
policies.
3. Implications of super-diversity for population research
It is becoming increasingly important for demographers to account for the multiple
dimensions of ethno-cultural diversity in population projections. This is essential for
research on the future consequences of immigration, and it would also serve to improve
analyses of demographic and social trends that are not directly focused on immigration
because of the way ethnic and cultural groups vary in their demographic and
socioeconomic behaviours. On the demographic side, cultural-ethnic and national
origin groups often vary with respect to the timing and occurrence of key demographic
processes: fertility, marriage, mortality, and migration. For example, newcomers tend to
show higher fertility (Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald 2000; Andersson 2004; Bélanger
and Gilbert 2003; Ng and Nault 1997; Trovato 1981) and lower mortality due to the
healthy immigrant effect (Bourbeau 2002; Chen, Wilkins, and Ng 1996; Hummer,
Benjamins, and Rogers 2004; Rees, Wohland, and Norman 2009; Singh and Miller
2004; Trovato 1985, 1993; Young 1987).
On the socioeconomic side, cultural-ethnic and national origin groups often differ
in educational and employment outcomes. For example, newcomers in Canada show on
average higher levels of educational attainment (Bonikowska, Green, and Riddell 2008;
Geschwender and Guppy 1995; Picot 2008), as the immigration policy aims at selecting
highly qualified candidates (Beach, Green, and Reitz 2003), regardless of the country of
origin. In Europe, by contrast, few immigrants are selected according to their skills
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(Büchel and Frick 2005; Münz 2007; Ruhs 2008), and in the US low-skill immigrants
make up a large share of legal and illegal immigration (Barrett 1998; Borjas 1987,
1989, 1994; Schultz 1998). Generally, when controlling for educational attainment,
immigrants show lower labour force participation rates than natives (Aydemir and
Skuterud 2005; Bloom, Grenier, and Gunderson 1994; Boudarbat and Boulet 2007,
2010; Boyd and Cao 2009; Ferrer and Riddell 2004; Kahn 2004; Meurs, Pailhé, and
Simon 2006; Model and Lin 2002). However, the skill composition of immigrant flows
affects the average labour force participation rates; immigrants tend to have higher
participation rates in countries such as the US, or in Southern Europe, where they are
generally less skilled (OECD 2010).
According to Preston, Heuveline, and Guillot (2000), the cohort-component
method “is now nearly the only method used for population projections, representing a
rare consensus for the social sciences.” However, super-diversity is impossible to
account for with standard cohort-component projection models. Although cohort-
component projections are frequently produced separately for major demographic
groups (such as by major racial or ethnic groups), they are inherently based on
aggregated population estimates and rates and are not agile enough to handle multi-
dimensional and dynamic forms of diversity.
First, cohort-component models, including its multi-state variants, have practical
limits in the number of events, states, and groups that can be modeled. Typically, they
provide information about projected population size, growth, age, and sex structure, and
at the most one or two other dimensions, but they rarely provide information on
socioeconomic characteristics. Yet, the prospective analysis of the consequences of
super-diversity requires the simultaneous projection of a large number of individual
characteristics or attributes, all of them having several categories. This extends beyond
the capacity of the multistate model whose state space (matrix size) would have to
include all possible combinations of attribute values.
Second, the cohort-component projection method tends to treat groups as mutually
exclusive and separated fixed categories (e.g., immigrant status (Lanzieri 2011);
race/ethnic groups (Colby and Ortman 2014; Rees et al. 2011, 2012); religion (Pew
Research Center 2015); or language spoken (Termote, Payeur, and Thibault 2011)).
Yet, under the super-diversity paradigm, group identities often involve multiple
overlapping dimensions that do not fit neatly in mutually exclusive groups and often
interact with each other. For example, not only are there differences between the labour
force participation levels of immigrants and natives, differences which tend to diminish
with the length of residence in the host country, but within the immigrant population
itself the pace at which this gap is reduced also varies according to place of origin,
membership of a particular ethnic group, linguistic proximity to the official language of
the host country, and other characteristics. This type of interaction can easily be
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modelled within a microsimulation model but not easily within a multi-state model.
Moreover, ethnic group identities may shift or fade over time, such that later generation
group members no longer identify with the group. For example, Duncan and Trejo
(2011) show substantial ethnic attrition among Hispanics that is strongly linked to
interethnic marriage, which increases across generations and with higher levels of
education. This process, which can be conceptualized as intra-generational and inter-
generational ethnic mobility, can hardly be modelled with the cohort-component
projection method.
Third, the microsimulation model can manage the heterogeneity problem much
more effectively than the cohort-component. This is due again to the limitation
regarding the number of states that can be practically implemented by the multi-state
model. For example, most projections assume that all women have the same age-
specific fertility rates, or all people experience the same age- and sex-specific mortality
rates, when in fact, these processes are likely to depend on a number of socioeconomic
and cultural factors. Additionally, the composition of groups may change over time.
Indeed, it is widely thought that immigrants and their families undergo profound
cultural and socioeconomic changes as a consequence of coming into contact with host
societies, making it useful, if not necessary, to take into account the effect of duration.
Although the pace (and even direction) of integration varies across groups, nearly all
national origin groups in the United States or Canada speak English or French by the
second generation (Bélanger, Lachapelle, and Sabourin 2011; Rumbaut, Massey, and
Bean 2006), and among immigrant groups that arrived with low levels of education,
educational attainment tends to increase substantially across generations (Park and
Myers 2010). These limitations suggest that it would be useful to develop a projection
model that goes beyond the cohort-component model.
We developed a microsimulation model to meet this need. The model is designed
to provide prospective analyses of the socioeconomic and cultural consequences of
population changes in high immigration countries. International in scope, we originally
developed the model for Canada, but have since adapted it for other immigration-
receiving countries, including the United States and the 28 member countries of the
European Union. The model could also be extended to other countries with similar
demographic regimes, such as Australia. In developing the model, our main objective
has been to study the possible consequences of alternate future immigration trends in
order to inform policies about important issues such as the integration of new
immigrants, social cohesion, labour force supply and composition in terms of education
level and skills, or long-term sustainability of social security programs and retirement
plans. To achieve this objective, the model encompasses as many socioeconomic and
ethno-cultural indicators as are available for each projected population.
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It is important to mention that the proposed microsimulation projection model is
not inherently opposed to the multi-state model. Both aim to model transitions between
the different states that characterize a population (van Imhoff and Post 1998), the multi-
state model using population groups, and the microsimulation model using the
individual. A multi-state model and a microsimulation model with the same
characteristics (state space) will produce the same results, more or less the Monte-Carlo
error associated with the stochastic process of microsimulation. The microsimulation
model, however, becomes much more efficient when the state space increases, since its
storage requirements grow linearly with the increase in projected population
characteristics, while the other grows exponentially. In addition, it is very difficult, if
not impossible, to take into account duration variables such as duration since
immigration or age at arrival in a multi-state model, whereas this is relatively easy in
microsimulation.
Our purpose for the remainder of the paper is to present the analytical framework
behind this endeavour, describe the general structure of the microsimulation models,
and share some of the results. We first describe the analytical framework of the
research project and the general structure and logic of the microsimulation models in
the next section. More detailed technical description of the modules that make up the
model in terms of their events, their parameters, and their outputs can be found
elsewhere5 (Bélanger and Sabourin 2017; Bélanger et al. 2019, 2018; Lutz and
Bélanger 2017; Marois, Sabourin, and Bélanger 2017). Next, we provide an overview
of the similarities and differences of the concepts used in the different countries.
Ideally, all markers of ethno-cultural diversity would be available for all countries of
interest and have the same categories everywhere, but in reality, this is not the case.
Finally, we present some results to illustrate how the microsimulation models can be
used. We present results that assess the impact of immigration on the ethno-cultural
(immigrant status, language, and religion) and socioeconomic (educational attainment
and labour force participation) characteristics of each population. The results’ section
also examines the projected changes in the labour force in each country by education
levels and language spoken, key characteristics for the analysis of economic
integration.
5 Additional methodological documentation is available at www.lsd.inrs.ca.
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4. An analytical framework for the prospective analysis of super-
diversity
Unlike the cohort-component projection method, which uses aggregated population
estimates as inputs and outputs, our microsimulation model operates at the individual
level. It projects the occurrence and timing of demographic and socioeconomic events
that shape future characteristics of individuals and their future offspring based on a
series of interrelated multivariate prediction models. In this section, we describe the
three analytic stages or steps we employed when developing the microsimulation
models, as illustrated in Figure 1.
The first stage is devoted to the analysis of the effects of ethno-cultural
characteristics on the demographic and socioeconomic behaviours of population
groups. This analysis is necessary to estimate the parameters that will serve as inputs in
the microsimulation model. It also provides the basis for a deeper comparative
knowledge of demographic and socioeconomic behaviours of new immigrants in
different Western countries. During this first phase, analytical efforts concentrate on
deriving the net effects of ethno-cultural variables – such as race, religion, language
use, and immigration status – on the components of population change and labour
market outcomes. Control variables of interest include age, sex, and education level.
The analyses aim at finding the impact of ethno-cultural variables on fertility, on the
likelihood of participating in the labour force, or on the probability of achieving a given
education level, to name but a few examples. Multivariate analyses are performed on
available public microdata sets such as censuses or social surveys. Base risks by age
and sex (and sometimes by other available variables, such as education) are usually
derived from the most robust available data sources (often vital statistics). Ethno-
cultural differentials, which are sometimes derived from surveys with lower sample
sizes, are added in the form of relative risks derived from regression parameters,
controlling for variables included in the base risk. This method allows for maximum
flexibility in the use of the various available data sources. Scenarios can then be built
by modifying the base risks or by making alternative assumptions on the relative risks.
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Figure 1: An analytical framework for the prospective analysis of super-
diversity
Our analysis of differentials in behaviours is rooted in the segmented assimilation
thesis (Portes and Zhou 1993). As such, it is assumed that the process of acculturation,
by which diverse ethnic groups come to share the culture and adopt the behaviours of
the majority (Waters and Jiménez 2005), does not operate uniformly on all immigrants.
Divergent outcomes have been observed between cohorts of immigrants (Picot and
Heisz 2000) and between racial or visible minority groups (Ali and Grabb 1998; Caron
Malenfant and Bélanger 2006; Corak 2008; Lian and Matthews 1998; Safi 2006). Yet,
although the assimilation perspective has been challenged, our framework nevertheless
underlines the importance of taking into account the duration of residence in the
country when studying and projecting behaviours of newcomers. Thus, “duration of
stay in the host country” and place of birth are introduced as important sources of
potential change, for example in fertility behaviour or in the knowledge of the host
country language. Moreover, according to Vertovec (2007), ethnicity or country of
origin alone provide a misleading one-dimensional appreciation of ‘super-diversity.’ He
also proposed the term to emphasize that “there is much to be gained by a multi-
dimensional perspective on diversity both in terms of moving beyond the ethnic group
as either the unit of analysis or sole object of study and by appreciating the coalescence
of factors which condition people’s lives” (Vertovec 2007: 1026). In our analysis, we
therefore explore the complexity of super-diversity by using, in addition to duration of
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stay in the country of residence and place of birth, other dimensions of ethno-cultural
diversity such as race, religion, or language proficiency when available.
In the second stage, knowledge arising from the analysis of ethno-cultural
differentials is integrated into specific scenarios to inform the multiple assumptions
supporting the microsimulation model. Importantly, these assumptions can be
combined to create plausible population changes or policy-driven ‘what-if’ scenarios.
In the context of the new immigration regime of high immigration and low fertility that
describes the countries under study, we sought to evaluate the likely impacts of various
future immigration scenarios. In other words, the level and composition of future
cohorts of immigrants are treated as a policy-driven phenomenon. Characteristics of
recent immigrants as observed in censuses or other sources can be used as a basis for a
‘baseline’ scenario, but these characteristics can also be modified through reweighting
procedures to match any other desired distributions (changes in regions of origin or in
education level of future immigrants, etc.).
Although central to the current demographic trends of high immigration and low
fertility, immigration is not the only component of population change shaping the
structure and composition of future populations. Most of the changes in the native
population are assumed to be shaped in accordance with the Demographic Metabolism
theory (Ryder 1965) which puts forward the importance of cohort succession to explain
social changes. According to the theory, even if individuals’ characteristics (education,
language, etc.) tend to remain fairly stable over the life course, this process provides
opportunity for social change due to the constant flow of new people entering the social
process through birth and the continuous exit of older individuals through death (Lutz
2013).
For example, women with higher education levels not only tend to postpone
childbearing but also show, in most countries, lower completed fertility compared to
less educated women (Basten, Sobotka, and Zeman 2014). At the same time, increasing
education also tends to postpone entry into the labour market, but increases work
intensity (higher participation rate, lower unemployment) of both males and females
over their lives, as it more than compensates for the late entry into the labour market
due to a longer time spent studying (Mincer 1974). As younger cohorts entering the
labour market or the childbearing ages are more educated than the older cohorts exiting
it, the consequence is that, even if nothing else changes, we can expect that the total
number of births would decline and that the total labour force population would
increase over time. Thus, the future increase in average education level of the
population, that is already built into the current age/education structure, will affect not
only the composition of future population in terms of education level but also their
future aggregated demographic (fertility, mortality) or economic (work intensity)
behaviours. We want to measure these potential effects of demographic metabolism
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both from a cross-sectional perspective (total fertility rate, gross labour force
participation rate, etc.) and longitudinal perspective (completed cohort fertility, cohort
economic dependency ratio, etc.).
In the third stage, we use dynamic microsimulation to synthesize the outcomes of
the two other phases in projection models. Microsimulation is a necessary technique to
produce demographic and socioeconomic projections in the context of super-diversity,
as it enables the modeling of complex behaviours and a large number of variables in a
consistent and flexible way. The capacity of the microsimulation model to project many
characteristics simultaneously also allows for the production of detailed tables of the
projection results. Results can be displayed in the form of cross-sectional distributions
of the population at different points in time up to the projection horizon but with many
more details than would be possible with deterministic approaches to population
projections.
5. Microsimulation models for Canada, United States, and European
Union
Three microsimulation models were developed, one for Canada, one for the United
States, and one for the 28 EU member states of the European Union. All three share a
common structure and general characteristics with respect to the analytical framework
presented above. One necessary input to the microsimulation process is the base
population, which must have micro-level information on the large number of individual
characteristics related to ‘super diversified’ populations. At the minimum, detailed data
is needed on birthplace and some other measure of diversity, either ethnicity (race),
language, or religion. In addition, in order to add a socioeconomic dimension to the
models, data on education levels and labour market activity is required.
The base population of all models comes from a public use microdata file of a
recent survey or census. This allows for greater portability and also increases the
transparency of the model and its potential usage, since its code and parameters,
including the base population, can be shared without risk of breaching confidentiality
rules, which are two important qualities to microsimulation models (Sutherland 2017).
The base population of the Canadian model was extracted from the Public Use
Microdata file of the 2011 National Household Survey (NHS). The survey numbers a
little more than 880,000 cases and directly measures all the variables included in the
microsimulation model (see Table 1 ). The base population of the American model was
extracted from the 2015 American Community Survey (ACS). All variables were
directly extracted from the ACS public use data file with the exception of religion,
which was imputed from the 2014 PEW survey. In total, the base population numbers
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more than 3.1 million cases representative of the total American population. The base
population of the European model was generated from the public use EU-Labour Force
Survey microdata files. Language spoken at home and religion were imputed based on
data extracted from the European Social Survey (all available waves since 2002). The
two most recent waves of the EU-LFS Survey (2014 and 2015) were merged to increase
the sample size, with the total base population numbering near 8.3 million cases.
All three models are time-based and event-based, dynamic, continuous time, open
to international migration, stochastic (Monte Carlo) microsimulation projections and
use the Modgen6 programming language. The models are time-based, meaning that all
individuals are simulated for one stage in time (one year) before moving to the next
stage in time. This allows for interactions between individuals and also for the use of
contextual variables or feedback effects in the computation of the probability of the
occurrence of a given event. The models are dynamic and in continuous time, meaning
that characteristics of individuals are modified continuously in ‘real time,’ in contrast to
discrete-time models, where characteristics are changed within predefined time units
(typically one year). In discrete-time models, the model designer must decide a priori
the order in which the events will occur. In a continuous time model, the precise
duration of each event is calculated in three circumstances: 1) at the beginning of the
simulation, 2) each time there is a change in a variable that features in the time function
used to calculate a given event, and 3) after the occurrence of the event. Modgen
automatically manages events’ waiting queue changes. This allows for an easier
treatment of competing risks. Age is a determinant of several events in the model, and
we can use it to illustrate how competing risks are managed. Every time the (discrete)
age of a simulated actor changes (at the birthday event) the risk of dying, of giving
birth, of moving to another area, or of emigrating, of obtaining a new degree, or of
being active or not, the labour market is recalculated and the waiting queue modified in
consequence. Thus, in a sense, the birthday event competes with all these other events.7
All three models simultaneously project demographic (age, sex, place of residence,
immigrant status), ethno-cultural (country of birth, language, and where possible other
variables such as visible minority groups in Canada or race in the United States and
religion in both Canada and Europe), and socioeconomic (education, labour force
participation) characteristics. Table 1 details the categories of the different variables
6 Modgen is a meta language of C++ developed and maintained by Statistics Canada. Modgen and its
documentation may be downloaded for free on Statistics Canada’s website. Modgen models are coded and
implemented in the Microsoft Visual Studio software suite. Once compiled, a Modgen model takes the form
of a stand-alone executable file (.exe) that allows manipulation of the model through a graphical user
interface. From this interface the user is able to modify simulation parameters and create customized
scenarios.
7 For more details and for Modgen model code of a simpler but similar microsimulation model, see Bélanger
and Sabourin (2017).
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that are projected for each model. Accounting for immigration, all three models work
with age at immigration and duration of residence in the country for immigrants. The
models further allow for changes in individual characteristics over the life course as
well as for inter-generational transfers of some characteristics of the mother to the
child. Finally, the models are microsimulation projections. Individuals from the base
populations are simulated one by one rather than projected as aggregated population
groups as in the cohort-component or multi-state models. The occurrence of any events
that shape the future population depends on a selection of individual characteristics that
can vary from one type of event to another and between countries.
Table 1: Description of the main data sources and variables included in the
three microsimulation models
Canada European Union United States
Demographic variables
Age 0–100
85+ as the open age group;
age is also a continuous
variable
0–100
Age is provided in 5 years age
groups in EU-LFS, assume a
uniform distribution of the
population in each single year of
age inside of a given age group
0–100
85+ as the open age group; age
is also a continuous variable
Sex 2 categories
Female and Male
2 categories
Female and Male
2 categories
Female and Male
Place of residence 24 categories
Provinces and metropolitan
areas (CMAs) counting more
than 500,000 people and 15%
visible minorities; non-CMA
regions and smaller CMAs are
regrouped at the provincial level
into ‘Rest of province’ categories
28 categories
28 European Union member
states
31 categories
Major immigration CMAs8, rest
of major immigration states and
rest of census regions
Ethno-cultural variables
Visible minority groups / Race 13 categories
White, Aboriginal, South Asian,
Chinese, Black, Filipino, Latin
American, Arab, Southeast
Asian, West Asian, Korean,
Japanese, Other visible minority
6 categories
Non-Hispanic White, Black,
Asian, Hispanic, Other, Multi-
race
Mother tongue 4 categories
English and French as official
languages and two groups of
nonofficial language (Anglotrope
and Francotrope)
8 The US major immigration CMAs are San Francisco, Southern California, rest of California, rest of Pacific,
Houston, Dallas–Fort Worth, rest of West South Central, Miami, Orlando, Tampa, rest of Florida,
Washington, DC, Atlanta, Raleigh–Durham, rest of South Atlantic, New York City, Philadelphia, rest of
Middle Atlantic, Chicago, Detroit, rest of East–North–Central, Boston, rest of New England, Las Vegas,
Phoenix, Denver, rest of Mountain, East–South–Central, St. Louis, Minneapolis, rest of West–North–Central.
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Table 1: (Continued)
Canada European Union United States
Ethno-cultural variables
Language spoken most
often at home
3 categories
English, French, Other
3 categories
Official language of the country
of residence, Other EU28
language, Non EU28 language
(imputed from ESS)
3 categories
English, Spanish, Other
Knowledge of official language 4 categories
English, French, English and
French, neither English nor
French
English proficiency 3 categories
English only, English proficient,
not English proficient
Religion 8 categories
No religion, Christian, Hindu,
Sikh, Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist,
Other religious affiliation
4 categories
Christian, Muslim, No religion,
Other religious affiliation
(imputed from the European
Social Survey)
8 categories
No religion, Christian, Hindu,
Sikh, Muslim, Jewish, Buddhist,
Other religious affiliation
(imputed from PEW 2014
survey)
Place of birth 27 categories
Canada, United States, Central
America, Jamaica, Other
Caribbean and Bermuda, South
America, United Kingdom,
Germany, Other Northern and
Western Europe, Poland, Other
Eastern Europe, Italy, Portugal,
Other Southern Europe, Eastern
Africa, Northern Africa, Other
Africa, West Central Asia and
the Middle East, China, Hong-
Kong, Other Eastern Asia,
Philippines, Other Southeast
Asia, India, Pakistan, Other
Southern Asia, Oceania and
others
12 categories
Own country, EU15, EU13,
Europe outside EU28, North
Africa, Other Africa, Near Middle
East, East Asia, Southeast Asia,
North America, Australia-
Oceania, Latin America
11 categories
United States, Mexico, Central
America and West Indies, South
America, Canada, Europe, East
Asia, Southeast Asia, Rest of
Asia, Africa, Other
Immigration status 3 categories
Non-Immigrant, Immigrant, Non-
Permanent Resident
3 categories
Non-immigrant, born in EU28,
born outside EU
2 categories
US-Born, Immigrant
Duration of residence 7 categories
Native-born, 0–4 years, 5–9
years, …, 20–24 years, 25+
7 categories
Native-born, 0–4 years, 5–9
years, …, 20–24 years, 25+
7 categories
Native-born, 0–4 years, 5–9
years, …, 20–24 years, 25+
Age at immigration 0–100 0–100 0–100
Generation status 5 categories
G1, G1.5, G2, G2.5, G3+
3 categories
G1, G1.5, G2+
3 categories
G1, G1.5, G2+
Socioeconomic variables
Education 4 categories
Less than high school, High
school diploma, Post secondary
less than bachelor, University
diploma (bachelor or higher)
5 categories
Less than high school, High
school diploma, Post secondary
less than bachelor, Bachelor
degree, Master or PhD degree
5 categories
Less than high school, High
school diploma, Associates
degree, College, Professional
degree
Education of the mother 3 categories
Less than high school, High
school diploma, Post secondary
3 categories
Less than high school, High
school diploma, Post secondary
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Table 1: (Continued)
Canada European Union United States
Socioeconomic variables
Country of highest degree 2 categories
Canada, Elsewhere
Labour force participation 2 categories
Active, Not in the labour force
(Inactive)
2 categories
Active, Not in the labour force
(Inactive)
2 categories
Active, Not in the labour force
(Inactive)
Unemployment 2 categories
Employed, Unemployed
2 categories
Employed, Unemployed
Main data source
Survey 2011 National Household
Survey Public-Use Microdata
File
2014–2015 EU-Labour Force
Survey and European Social
Survey (2001–2014), European
2011 Censuses
2015 American Community
Survey
Sample size 882,287 8,297,031 3,147,005
Weights Average of 60.2, range from 0.1
to 12026.0, adjusted to match
the 2011 population estimates
by age, sex, and province.
Average of 37.0, range from
32.4 to 460.6, adjusted to match
2011 Census population counts
by age, sex, education, and
place of birth
Average of 102, range from 1 to
3596.
We aimed at developing microsimulation models to project ethno-cultural
diversity in selected developed countries to foresee the implications of high
immigration on demographic trends and its socioeconomic impacts. Demographic and
socioeconomic variables are derived from very similar concepts across all studied
countries. All three models are by sex and by single year of age. All three models also
account for internal migration between their sub-areas. The Canadian and the American
models count 24 and 31 places of residence respectively representing the major
immigration Census Metropolitan Areas of each country, residual sub-areas at the
provincial level for Canada, and major immigration states or census regions at the state
level for the United States. In the European model, sub-areas represent the 28 EU
member states. We use relatively broad education categories in order to obtain
comparable groups despite significant differences in national education systems. The
labour force status is defined in the same way in all the countries studied, and it is based
on the International Labour Organization.
The nature of ethno-cultural variables, however, differ more between the three
models due to different historical and social contexts. First, the notion of race or ethnic
origin is absent from the European data used (and from most European surveys). In the
United States, the race variable is built around racial groups (Black/White) and from
Hispanic and Asian origins from which we created 6 categories, while in Canada the
similar concept is defined into 12 categories of visible minority groups specified by the
1991 Law on employment and equity.
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Second, language variables are part of the Canadian Censuses since its beginning
and are still omnipresent in Canadian surveys because of the dual French and English
origins in Canada. Thus, the Canadian model projects the first language spoken by a
person (mother tongue), language used at home, and knowledge of the official
languages (English or French), but there is no question on language proficiency. The
American survey asks only about the language spoken at home, but for those not using
English it asks the level of proficiency in English, which for our purpose is probably a
better concept than the Canadian one. Europe is, of course, a multilingual region where
the official language (or languages in some cases) differs from one country to another.
From the question on language spoken at home in the European Social Survey we
derived a three-category variable that distinguishes speakers of the country’s official
language from those speaking another European language and those speaking a non-
European language.
Third, religion is directly asked in the Canadian decennial censuses, and the large
sample size allowed for the creation of eight religious categories reflecting the most
important groups of this highly multicultural country. The same categories were derived
from the PEW survey and imputed to the American base population extracted from the
ACS. In Europe, the smaller sample size of the European Social Survey used to impute
religion to the base population and the high prevalence of Islam among non-Christian
population forced us to create only four categories for the religion variable.
Finally, all three models have a sufficient number of regions of birth categories for
foreign-born, but these categories differ between models to better reflect the
immigration source countries of each. Age at immigration and duration of stay in the
current country of residence for foreign-born is available in all three microsimulation
models, but the place of birth of parents is only available in Canada, which allows for a
more detailed generational status variable. Despite these limitations and inconsistencies
across models, our models undoubtedly offer a new innovative tool to address issues
related to super-diversity in high immigration developed countries.
For each event occurring in the projection model, Table 2 shows the individual
characteristics taken into account to determine the probability of its occurrence and
derive its waiting time. Each event can have its own set of determinants. Taking the
example of fertility, in all three models, the risk of giving birth varies with age, region
of residence, education, and immigrant status. However, microsimulation is a flexible
methodology allowing the use of different equations and risk models for the same event
according to an individual’s region or country of residence. Thus, when available, other
ethno-cultural determinants of fertility are accounted for, such as religion and visible
minority groups in Canada or race in the United States.
There is not enough space here to further explain each of the modules of the
microsimulation programs that allow the different characteristics of the simulated cases
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to evolve during the projection. However, each model is described in detail in a
technical document available online to which the interested reader can refer (Bélanger
et al. 2019, 2018). However, given the importance of international migration in our
framework, it is important to describe how international immigration is treated in the
models. Also, since several of the examples chosen to illustrate the usefulness of the
projection model focus on activity, we also describe how the activity status is derived.
Emigration is modeled as an annual risk of out-migration in a manner similar to
the migration between sub-areas of the projection model, except that rather than
reassign a new place of residence to the actor being simulated, the occurrence of the
emigration event terminates it and removes it from the projection. On the other hand,
immigration is not treated as other events in the microsimulation models. This is
because we are not projecting the rest of the world, and thus new immigrants coming
during the projection are external to the model and must be created in the same way as
the actors from the base population.9 The characteristics of recent immigrants (less than
five years) from the base population are used as a basis to determine the characteristics
of future immigrants in the simulation for baseline scenarios. In the simulation,
whenever the record of a recent immigrant is read from the base population file, it is
first simulated as a member of the base population and then re-simulated once in every
year of the projection as a new immigrant. This method for generating immigrants
implies that all immigrant cohorts have the same characteristics as recent immigrants
from the base population. To allow for some variation, the individual weights are
adjusted to match desired distributions. Through reweighting, it is thus possible to
change the total volume of immigration during the simulation. It is also possible to
change the immigrant distribution according to different characteristics such as age or
education. Thus, the annual number of immigrants and their characteristics are
predetermined within user-defined scenarios for each simulation.
9 Their starting times, however, are spread all along the course of the simulation.
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Table 2: Determinants of the different events in the microsimulation models
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Fertility X X X C,U X X C X Vital statistics, logisticregression
Mortality X X X C C C Population estimates,Cox regression
Internal migration X X X C,U C,U C,U C,U C C,U C,U Logistic regression, O/Dmatrices
Emigration X X X C Population estimates,relative risks
Official language
acquisition/Language used at home X X X X X
Survival curves, O/D
matrices
Intergenerational language shift X X X O/D matrices
Intergenerational transfers of
race/visible minority C,U C,U O/D matrices
Intergenerational transfers of religion X X C,U C,U C,U O/D matrices
Education attainment X X X X C,U X X E E,U Multinomial/Orderedlogit
Literacy C C C C C C C C Linear regression
Labour force participation X X X C,U X X X Logistic regression
Note: X = All models, C = Canada, E = EU28, U = USA.
6. Results
The microsimulation models provide a lot of flexibility in terms of scenario building.
Assumptions can be made on the future evolution of the different components of
population change both in terms of the general intensity of the phenomenon or its
composition. Assumptions about future immigration, for instance, can be made not only
on the size of the future cohorts of immigrants, but also in terms of its composition by
country of origin, education level, or any other characteristics that can be relevant.
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In this section, we provide five examples that demonstrate ways that the
microsimulation models can be used. The first example is a simulation that projects
ethno-cultural and socioeconomic changes for the baseline scenario only. That is, the
scenario assumes the continuation of current trends and generally replicates the medium
scenario of national statistical agencies in terms of projected population size and age
structure. The second example is a simulation of the consequences of changing levels of
immigration. It specifically focuses on labour force consequences of different levels of
immigration by constructing stylised scenarios where the number of immigrants is
doubled or set to zero. The third example is a simulation that assesses the impact of
changing characteristics of immigrants. It simulates the impact of modifying the
composition of migrant cohorts by assuming that immigrants to the EU28 or to the
United States have the same distribution by education level as Canadian immigrants. In
the fourth example, we illustrate the possibility of presenting results at a more detailed
geographic scale. Finally, the fifth example illustrates the way the model can be used to
provide estimates calculated over the lifetime of cohorts, thus taking a longitudinal
perspective for estimates of labour force characteristics. These examples are presented
to illustrate the possibilities of the model. A proper evaluation of any proposed policies
on international migration would need full treatment in further research.
6.1 Example 1: Ethno-cultural diversity
Figure 2 shows the projected evolution of three indicators of diversity for Canada, the
United States, and the EU28: the percentage of foreign-born population (in the EU28
case, it is the proportion of the population born outside the EU), the percentage of the
population using a non-official language at home, and the percentage of non-
Christians10. In terms of the percentage of foreign-born population, Canada is starting at
a much higher level (21%) compared to the United States (14%) and the EU28 (8%).
Compared to the United States, Canada has an immigration rate twice as high and even
higher compared to the EU28. Assuming that this situation would continue, Canada’s
foreign-born population would continue to grow and would likely reach 30% in 2061.
Europe’s foreign-born population would grow at a faster pace than in the other two
regions. At the end of the projection horizon, the European population can be composed
of about 19% foreign-born, which is higher than the projected proportion for the United
States.
10 The percentages of non-Christian are excluding the non-affiliated.
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Figure 2: Proportion of the projected population with different ethno-cultural
characteristics, 2011–2056, Canada, USA, EU28
Looking at the second indicator, the proportion of the population using a non-
official language at home, the picture is much different. Canadian immigration is much
more diverse in its origins and languages spoken than what is observed in and projected
for the other two regions. Also, there is a larger share of its immigrant population that
already speaks the official languages (English and French) at arrival compared to the
United States, where a large share of immigrants speaks Spanish. Perhaps because of
this greater heterogeneity, the retention of foreign languages might be lower in Canada
than elsewhere. As a consequence, even if Canada has the highest share of foreign-born
and a fast increase in that share, the United States shows a much higher proportion of
its population using a non-official (mostly Spanish) language at home.
Religion is another relevant ethno-cultural characteristic for the projection of
diversity as religious diversity is often seen as a source of social fragmentation and
declining social cohesion (Alesina et al. 2003; Goujon et al. 2007). Again, the
progression of this indicator draws a different picture. At the start of the projection, the
proportion of non-Christians is higher in Canada, and it is expected to grow fast during
the projection period. In the United States and in EU28, the proportion of non-Christian
population is projected to increase faster than the proportions of immigrants or the
proportion of the population using a non-official language at home. This is because
children of immigrants born in the country of destination are by definition native-born
and because the inter-generational transfer of religion is lower than the inter-
generational transfer of language. Although children born in an immigrant family where
a non-official language is spoken will also use that language at home, they are more
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likely to experience a language shift when forming their own family than to undergo a
change in faith.
6.2 Example 2: Immigration and linguistic composition
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of different levels of immigration on the linguistic
composition of future labour force by assuming stylised scenarios where the number of
immigrants is either doubled or set to zero (emigration rates remain the same as in the
baseline scenario). Although they start at different levels, the pattern shown by the
evolution of this variable is similar in Canada and in the United States. In the baseline
scenario and the doubling migration scenario, the percentage of the population using a
non-official language at home increases rapidly at first, but the rate of increase
decreases with time. In the EU, the percentage of non-official language starts at a lower
level at the beginning of the projection period, but increases faster than in Canada and
the United States. In the no-migration scenario, the percentage of the population using a
non-official language at home would go down in Canada and the United States, but
would remain at about the same level in the EU. This is due to the fact that in the
European model migrations between EU-28 countries are treated as internal migration
and are thus continuing at the same pace as before in the zero-migration scenario.
Figure 3: Percent of the population speaking a non-official language at home
under three different assumptions of immigration, Canada, the USA
and EU28, 2011–2061
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6.3 Example 3: The educational attainments of immigrants
Canada’s immigration policy is often praised for its point-based selection system,
which focuses on variables linked with human capital such as age, education, and
knowledge of the official languages. Because of this point-based system, Canada has a
higher proportion of graduated immigrants when compared to many other immigration
countries. It is interesting to explore how modifying the immigrant selection process
rather than modifying the size of future immigration cohorts could alter the future
composition of working populations in terms of education attainment. The indicator is
obtained by creating a scenario that attributes the Canadian immigrants’ distribution by
education level to projected immigrants in the other models.
Figure 4 illustrates such an investigation by looking at what could be the potential
impact of modifying the composition of migrant cohorts on the size of the active
population with post-secondary education in the EU28 and United States. To put an
emphasis on the evolution of the working population with post-secondary education
rather than on the different population size or educational levels observed in the two
models, results are scaled to 100 in 2015.
The solid lines in the figure represent the projected increase of highly educated in
the active population under the baseline scenario, and we can see that this number is
likely to increase faster in the United States than in the EU 28. The dotted lines
represent the possible evolution of that indicator if future immigrants would be selected
using a Canadian-like point system (CanSce). For both regions, this scenario shows a
faster increase in the number of highly educated, but the differences between the
selection and the baseline scenarios are more important in the European model than in
the American model. At the end of the projection, we observe a difference of 11
percentage points between the two American scenarios and a difference of 15 points in
the European case.
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Figure 4: Growth of the active population with post-secondary education
(2015 = 100), the USA and EU28 2015–2060 baseline scenario (Ref.),
and a scenario where immigrants are selected using a Canadian-like
point system (CanSce)
6.4 Example 4: Regional variations
The models have an important regional component that does not appear in the results
presented so far. In the Canadian and American cases, regions are formed from
geographic information on the metropolitan area and the state (in the United States) or
province (in Canada). It is thus possible to analyse the future impact of immigration on
high immigration regions such as New York, Los Angeles, and Miami in the United
States or Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver in Canada. The analysis can focus on the
ethno-cultural changes in the population composition or on the impact of immigration
on different labour markets in terms of active and inactive population. In the European
case, the regions represent each of the national populations forming the EU28, and
regional analyses would thus be limited to countries.
To illustrate the possibilities of presenting results at another geographic scale,
Figure 5 shows the projected change in the population distribution by religious
affiliation in six of the G7 countries (Japan is missing).
In all six countries, the share of Christians decreases but for different reasons. In
the United States, most immigrants are Christians, and the 9 points decrease in the
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percentage of Christians over the projection period results almost all from an increase
in Non Affiliated; the Muslims and ‘Other’ religions categories have their share
increased by only 1 percentage point over the projection period. In the European
countries, by contrast, the decrease in the proportion of Christians is much less
attributable to disaffiliation and much more to the faster increase in the number of
Muslims. Between 2011 and 2060, the baseline scenario projects an increase of the
Muslims’ share, varying between 8 percentage points for Italy and 11 percentage points
for France. Since the baseline scenario assumes that the characteristics of future
immigrants will be the same as the most recent immigrants, the share of the ‘Other’
religions category barely changes over the projection period in all European countries.
Reflecting the more diverse origins of Canadian immigrants, the figure also shows that
in the Canadian case, the decrease in the share of Christians is associated with both a
faster increase in the population of Muslim (plus 7 percent points) and of other religions
(plus 3 percent points).
Figure 5: Observed (2011/2015) and projected (2060/2061) total population by
religious affiliation, Canada, USA, EU28, baseline scenario
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6.5 Example 5: A cohort perspective to economic dependency ratio
The examples provided just now are essentially cross-sectional analyses in that they
provide estimates of the size or composition of the population or population subgroups
at various points in time. However, our microsimulation models also permit a
longitudinal analysis that follows individuals over time. As an example, to better
determine the impact of immigration on pension plan sustainability (at least in a pay-as-
you-go type of pension plan), it is preferable to take a longitudinal perspective and
count the number of years lived as active and inactive over the life course for foreign-
born and native-born cohorts.
We carried out this analysis and present the results in Figure 6, which compares
the cohort economic dependency ratios of foreign- and native-born by education level.
The cohort economic dependency ratio (CEDR) is defined as the ratio between the
number of years lived inactive divided by the number of years lived active over the life
course. It takes into account the increase in life expectancy as well as, in our
microsimulation model, the increase in older workers labour force participation and the
increase in educational attainment. CEDR also considers differentials in labour force
participation by immigrant status and education level and differentials in educational
attainment between population groups. In the context of current labour market changes,
it is important to take these characteristics of the population and their plausible
evolution in the different regions into consideration to better estimate the potential
effects of immigration. Education is generally completed by age 25 and, for that reason,
we compute the CEDR for the population aged 25 and over.
We note on Figure 6 that for all educational groups combined, the CEDR is higher
for immigrants compared to natives, meaning that in general immigrants contribute
fewer years of activity for each year lived inactive. The differences between natives and
immigrants are larger in the EU-28 and smaller in the United States. In the EU28, an
immigrant can expect to live 1.22 years inactive for each year lived active compared to
0.82 for a European-born. In the United States the corresponding ratios are much closer
with 0.89 and 0.74. Canada has the lowest CEDR for both its native (0.65) and
immigrant (0.79) population.
Looking next at the differences in CEDR by educational level, we note that the
ratios tend to be lower for higher educational levels. This holds for natives and
immigrants alike. Higher participation rates over the working life and higher age at
retirement add up to fewer years lived as inactive for each year lived as active among
the more educated population. Additionally, immigrants have higher ratios than natives
for all educational levels except for the less than high school level in the United States,
although the differences between immigrants and natives tend to decrease as education
level increases.
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Figure 6: Cohort economic dependency ratios (CEDR) of immigrants and
natives by education levels, Canada, USA, and EU28
7. Discussion and conclusion
The main objective of this paper was to present the analytical framework supporting
our efforts in analysing prospective super-diversity in high immigration countries. We
believe that this is important because these societies are getting more diverse at a rapid
pace. The increase in immigration and the resulting increase in diversity are often
praised for their economic and social benefits and for other advantages, such as impact
on research and innovation. Ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversities have become,
and will likely continue to be, a critical matter with political and social implications in
several countries. Alesina et al. (2003) showed that ethnic and linguistic fragmentation
can contribute to slower economic growth, and more homogeneous countries also tend
to be better governed. More recently, Patsiurko, Campbell, and Hall (2012) applied a
similar analysis to 30 OECD countries for two periods (1985 and 2000). They showed
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that the negative relationship between ethnic fragmentation and economic growth is
also present in the context of developed economies. Increasing diversity from mass
migration can also have a negative impact on aspects of social capital like shared norms
and trust (Levy 2017; Putnam 2007) and have influenced critical political outcomes
such as the Brexit (Coleman 2016; Gietel-Basten 2016), the rise of populism
movements such as the one leading to the election of Donald Trump in the United
States, or the recent entrance of deputies from an extreme right party (Alternative für
Deutschland) in the Germans’ Bundestag for the first time since World War II.
Projecting the changes in population composition in terms of diversity has therefore an
interest per se.
Another important aspect of our model and analysis is the focus on the projection
of educational attainment and labour force activity. Although international immigration
has, at best, only a small effect on a country’s population aging, the concentration of
immigrant cohorts in the working age groups can certainly help in addressing slower
and possibly negative labour force population growth, at least for high immigration
regions. By increasing the number of workers, increasing immigration can decrease the
economic dependency ratio of a population, but in a context of below replacement
fertility, adopting such a solution leads to a continuously increasing need for
immigration (United Nations 2000). At best, this is a short-term view. In addition,
simply increasing the working age population through immigration might not help the
economy if the number of inactives increases faster than the number of actives because
of low labour force participation rates among migrants (Bélanger and Bastien 2013).
A second objective of this paper was to present the general structure of the
microsimulation models and to show how much more informative results from this type
of projection models can be in comparison to more traditional cohort-component or
multi-state models. We illustrated this point by presenting a selection of results that
demonstrate the capacity of the model to address a variety of research questions. In
doing so, the paper only superficially touches upon the issues related to population
changes coming with super-diversity. The models provide many opportunities to
conduct future in-depth studies, many of which are currently in preparation. There are
certain limitations that must be reminded, notably for the international comparisons
results and analyses. In the European model, the regions represent each of the national
populations forming the EU28, while in the Canadian and American models, regions
are formed from geographic information on cities, states, or provinces. As a result, in
the European model, immigrants are both EU-nationals, which are moving from one
EU country to another, and foreign-born people moving into Europe. Policy-wise, the
European results, hence, cannot be directly compared to the American and Canadian
projections, since in the latter, internal migration streams never create international
migrants.
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